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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
5-2a-3(2)(j) confers jurisdiction on this Court to decide this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the district court correctly construe, interpret and apply the 
Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Medved v. Glenn. 2004 WL1065503 (Utah 
App.)? 
This is a question of law, reviewable for "correctness." Drake v. Industrial 
Commission. 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997); Trujillo v. Jenkins. 840 P.2d 777-
778-79 (Utah 1992); State v. Montova. 887 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1994); Billings v. 
Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996). 
_!. Did the Utah Court of Appeals in Medved v. Glenn, supra, 
correctly interpret, construe and apply the Utah Supreme Court's decision 
in Seale v. Gowans. 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996)? 
This is a question of law, reviewable for "correctness." Drake, id.; Trujillo. 
id., State, id. 
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3. In Utah may a plaintiff maintain an action for increased risk of 
cancer recurrence when combined with a claim for actual present damages 
resulting from substandard medical care? 
This too is a question of law, reviewable for "correctness." Sorensen v. 
Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 873 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah App. 1994); Broad 
Waterv. Old Republic Sur.. 854 P.2d 857, 834 N.3 (Utah 1993); Architectural 
Commission v. Kabatznick. 949 P.2d 776, 777 (Utah App. 1997); Roarke v. 
Crabtree. 893 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1995). 
4. Is an increased risk of recurrence of cancer actionable in Utah, 
regardless of whether combined with a claim of actual, present damage 
resulting from substandard medical care? If so, when does the statute of 
limitations begin to run on such a claim? 
This too is a question of law, reviewable for "correctness." 
Orton v. Carton, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); Klinqer v. Kiqhtlv. 791 
P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1990). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
This is an appeal from the district court's grant of the defendant's motion to 
d 
On June 18, 2002, Richard Irion, M.D. undertook to perform a vaginal 
illlii'v ' J i n * i Ih Nil / ill in/1" yuMj ( ihI II Ill,i»nilI liiMinm i,/ mime" Inn pos t m e n o p a u s a l b l e e d i n g . (( » 
No ultrasound was performed prior to this surgery. (R.10). However, an ultrasound 
performed approximately two years earlier revealed an apparent cyst and endometrial 
thickening. (R.10). During the June 18, 2002 surgery, Dr. Irion came upon a large 
tumor which he mistook for a yellow mass. In attempting to remove it, he ruptured the 
tumor, spilling its contents into Mrs. Snow's peritoneal cavity 
Di Irion failed to perform a wash of Mrs. Snow's peritoneal cavity to clean the 
area in whicl i the iii|ilii!i'il hninir i onlenls h.ui spilled ill"11 Hi I  II n II Hi 
surgery, he informed Mr. and Mrs. Snow that the tumor was benign. (R.1 hat 
in • a 
pathology report that the tumor contained malignant cells. Although Dr. Irion knew the 
IIII II III 11 H i I HI I'll IIIIIK i l l l l l l i l l l i III III. Ill III Ill III I l l I III I lllllll Il II I II II III M i l l III1 I I I ' ill in h I | | | e ( l i I H J i J i U U b 
nature of the tumor nor of the dangers incident to the spread of its malignant cells in her 
1
 All references to the district court record shall be cited as "R. ." Plaintiffs 
shall be referred to sometimes collectively as "Mrs. Snow" and sometimes as "the 
Snows." Defendant shall be referred to as "Dr. Irion." 
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body. (R.11). Due to the delay in the Snows' receiving word of the malignancy of the 
tumor, Mrs. Snow did not begin chemotherapy until over 90 days after the surgery in 
which the tumor was discovered. (R.11). 
Following the cancer diagnosis, Mrs. Snow underwent extensive cancer 
treatment, including radiation and chemotherapy. (R.11). The oncological therapy 
has been accompanied by considerable trauma, illness and expense. Although the 
therapy appears to have been successful, Mrs. Snow remains at heightened risk of the 
cancer. (R.11). 
The Snows' complaint alleges that their damages include the incurrence of 
significant medical and medical-related expenses, a loss of income, an impairment of 
earning capacity and a loss of consortium. The complaint also alleges a likelihood of 
cancer recurrence in Mrs. Snow, resulting in additional damages and a shortened life-
span. (R.13-14). 
Dr. Irion filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting that because Mrs. Snow has not yet 
suffered a recurrence of the cancer, she and her husband are unable, as a matter of 
law, to establish a legally cognizable injury to satisfy their prima facie claims of medical 
negligence against Dr. Irion. (R.28). 
Based on its reading of the Court of Appeals' decision in Medved, the district 
court concluded that: 
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the Snows cannot pursue their possible later-developing 
damages, nor may they split their claims as they are seeking 
to do. Accordingly, dismissal, without prejudice is 
appropriate. Consequently, defendant's motion to dismiss is 
granted. 
(R.92). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
T I in is C(i)i 11 t's Medved < J ec11. i »11 1 1 1 1 • 111'. 1 1 1 1 i • •. ; i m i < I i;•» c 11 v i \ n i a I 11 ( ' 11 III III i 1II i i $ 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996). 
Applying the Medved holding as interpreted by the district court to this case would 
. Medved ch 
have any fairness in this case, it would have to be applied in a way that expressly 
allows the Snows to re-file at anytime up to 2 years after Mrs. Snow's death 
ipjjardless Il liiHIiti t in rHixvi in i iiiiiii . .mil m 1 (ills I lei 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
H i i i 1 nil!11.In IK II ,, n i l ' s lensinn In fumf rlisnii1^ \\ of |\ Irs Sin ^ » "<-, roiiipLnnt 
without prejudice and all of its conclusions supporting that decision constitute 
rulings of law. The proper standard of review of those issues is "correctness," 
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granting no deference to the district court's conclusions. See ISSUES 
PRESENTED, supra, and cases cited therein (pp. 1-2 , supra); See also White v. 
Deeselhurst. 879 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Utah 1994). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
MRS. SNOW'S COMPLAINT AMPLY ALLEGES 
LEGALLY COGNIZABLE INJURIES SEPARATE 
FROM HER CLAIM OF HEIGHTENED RISK OF 
CANCER RECURRENCE. 
Dr. Irion declared in writing to the district court that: "the sole question 
before this Court is . . . whether plaintiffs' claim of increased risk is an actual 
present injury sufficient to sustain their claims of injury against Dr. Irion." (R.30). 
This is incorrect. The Snows' complaint alleges significant damages separate 
and apart from Mrs. Snow's claim of increased risk for cancer recurrence. It 
asserts, for example, that Dr. Irion's substandard medical care has already 
caused them: (a) loss of income and an impairment of earning capacity (R.14); 
(b) the incurrence of significant costs for medical care and related needs (R.14); 
and (c) "pain, grief, mental anguish, depression, emotional distress and loss of 
enjoyment of life" (R.13). Additional present damages not founded exclusively 
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upon Mrs. Snow's heightened risk of cancer recurrence are alleged in fflJ27-29 of 
the Snows' Amended Complaint: 
27. Plaintiff Marion Snow has suffered a significant 
permanent injury that has substantially changed her 
lifestyle, including incapacitating her to perform the 
types of activities and other functions which she 
performed before she was injured as a result of 
defendant's substandard medical care. 
28. The activities and functions plaintiff Marion Snow can no 
longer perform or can no longer perform in the manner 
she previously performed them include, but are not 
limited to, household duties and spousal activities. 
29. Plaintiffs have suffered a profound diminution in their 
quality of life. The injury to plaintiff Marion Snow 
complained of herein has significantly impacted her 
husband, plaintiff Roger Snow in varied and significant 
ways. Plaintiff Roger Snow is entitled, therefore, to 
recover loss of consortium damages as provided by 
Utah law. 
(R.14-15). 
In our system of pleading, it is the prerogative of the plaintiff, not the 
defendant, to declare what her claims and damages are. Here, the Snows claim 
Dr. Irion's substandard care has already caused them significant harm apart from 
Mrs. Snow's heightened risk of being further debilitated or killed by the cancer Dr. 
Irion caused to be spread in her body. They should not be precluded from 
-7-
proving what they have pled.2 
II. 
THIS COURT'S MEDVED DECISION, AS APPLIED BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT, MISCONSTRUES AND IS AT VARIANCE 
WITH THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN 
SEALE V. GOWANS . 
In its memorandum decision herein, the district court quoted from this 
Court's Medved opinion and then stated: "Based upon the foregoing, it is clear 
that under the current state of the law, the Snows cannot pursue their possible 
later-developing damages. . . . " (R. 92). This conclusion is simply erroneous. 
In Seale. our Supreme Court acknowledged that when a person suffers 
physical harm caused by another's negligence, she is entitled to recover 
2ln support of his motion to dismiss before the district court, Dr. Irion 
declared "the gravamen of plaintiffs claim . . . is that Dr. Irion failed to properly 
diagnose and advise Mrs. Snow of her cancer, and to refer her to an oncologist." 
(R.29). Dr. Irion's written argument to the district court then undertakes to instruct 
that court that "Dr. Irion did not cause Mrs. Snow's cancer." (R.30). Those 
assertions were both gratuitous and at variance with assertions plainly set forth in 
the Snows' operative pleading. The Snows' Complaint asserts that although Dr. 
Irion did not cause Mrs. Snow's tumor, he did cause the spread of its malignant 
cells throughout her body when he ruptured it, spilled its malignant cells into her 
peritoneal cavity and failed to perform an immediate wash of the area. (See ffij 
10 and 11 of Amended Complaint; (R.10-11). 
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damages not only for the harm already suffered, but also for that which will 
probably result in the future: 
General tort law recognizes that when a person has 
suffered physical harm caused by the negligence of 
another, "he is entitled to recover damages not only for 
harm already suffered, but also for the which will 
probably result in the future." Restatement (Second), of 
Torts §912 cmt. e (1979): Jackson v.Johns-Manville 
Sales Corp.. 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th Cir. 1986). Indeed, 
most courts follow the general rule that once some injury 
become actionable, a plaintiff must plead all damages, 
both present and future, and cannot thereafter bring 
another action once future harm occurs. Gideon v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp.. 761 F.2d 1120, 1136-37 
(&h Cir. 1985).... 
(923P.2dat1364). 
The district court apparently accepted Dr. Irion's contention that this Court's 
recent decision in Medved v. Glenn. 2004 WL 1065503 (Utah App.) holds that a 
plaintiff may not maintain an action to recover damages when part of the claim is 
an enhanced risk of cancer recurrence. To the extent this Court's Medved 
decision so holds, it is in error and inconsistent with the actual holding of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Seale v. Gowans. 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996). 
The distinguishing fact in Seale v. Gowans was the apparent absence of an 
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allegation of present damage apart from a fear of cancer recurrence.3 The simple 
holding in Seale was that "damages in the form of an enhanced risk only are not 
sufficient to start the running the statute of limitations." (Id. at 1365). The 
Supreme Court considered several cases from other jurisdictions and found them 
distinguishable because in them "the plaintiffs had suffered actual damages in 
conjunction with the increased risk of the cancer's recurrence." (Id. at 1365). Our 
Supreme Court did not declare in Seale that a plaintiff may not recover damages 
for enhanced risk of cancer recurrence. It merely declared that if one has no 
damages until the recurrence of cancer, the statute does not begin to run against 
that claimant until the cancer recurs. There is nothing in Seale suggesting a 
claimant who has sustained an actual injury may not simultaneously pursue a 
claim for enhanced risk of future harm. On the contrary, our Supreme Court 
noted: 
[Cjurrent recovery for future harm is "based upon the 
probability that harm of one sort or another will ensue 
and upon its probable seriousness if it should ensue." 
3
 In the Medved case, the record shows (at R.179 -180 therein) that Mrs. 
Seale's complaint in Seale v. Gowans sought damages for injuries likely to occur 
in the future. Her cancer did recur after she filed her complaint. Our Supreme 
Court in Seale actually found that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on 
Ms. Seale because of the defendant's failure to prove "that in 1988 Ms. Seale 
could complain of any actual or present damages." Seale. id. at 1364-65. 
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Restatement (Second) of Torts $912. cmt. e (1979). 
Many courts, following the Restatement approach, have 
adopted a "reasonable certain" standard, requiring that 
the plaintiffs prove that it is more likely than not that the 
projected consequence will occur. See Wilson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp.. 684 F.2d 111,119 (DC Cir. 1982). 
Id. at 1365. 
Our Court then went on to note unfairness would result if 
Plaintiffs who are not exhibiting any actual physical 
harm but are facing the running of the limitations period 
[were] forced to bring an action for injuries that may or 
may not occur in the future. 
Id. at 1366. Our Court then noted in passing that "many of these plaintiffs will be 
unable to produce the necessary evidence to show that the future harm is more 
likely to occur than not." Id. at 1366. This passing comment should not be 
interpreted as precedent for the proposition that a claim for enhanced risk of 
cancer recurrence is not actionable in Utah. On the contrary, it merely suggests 
that a claim for enhanced risk of cancer recurrence is sometimes difficult for 
plaintiffs to prove. 
Seale does appear to support the proposition that if a man had been 
exposed to a toxic chemical which has been shown to cause cancer but has 
suffered no ill effects from the exposure, he could not bring a cause of action for 
enhanced risk of cancer. Under Seale. he would have to have actually 
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contracted cancer before the claim would arise. If, however, as a result of 
exposure to the toxic chemical, the man became ill, lost work and/or required 
significant medical treatment and expenditure, then he could seek his actual 
damages for his current illness and also seek damages for his enhanced risk of 
cancer if he could prove it was "more likely than not" to manifest itself. 
Nothing in our Supreme Court's opinion in Seale v. Gowans. supra, is 
inconsistent with preexisting law that if one pleads an actual, present injury, one 
may also plead future damages that are reasonably probable to occur. In Seale, 
our Court expressly stated "once some harm is manifest, the limitations period 
begins to run on all claims, present and future." Id. at 923 P.2d at 1364. There, 
unlike here, Ms. Seale claimed no injury until cancer recurred in her hip. Our 
Court found that the last event necessary to complete the cause of action was the 
recurrence of cancer and, therefore, it was that event that initiated the running of 
the statute of limitations. 
Utah's legislature has included in our Health Care Malpractice Act a four-
year statute of repose, along with a two-year statute of limitations. In Utah, no 
cause of action for medical malpractice can be entertained more than 4 years 
after the date of the alleged malpractice. UCA §78-14-4(1). If a woman who has 
-12-
had to endure extensive cancer treatment for the spread of a malignancy which 
could have been prevented by appropriate medical treatment has to wait until she 
suffers recurrence of cancer before she may file suit, the recurrence may recur 
more than 4 years after the original negligence. She would be prevented from 
bringing an action. That would be a travesty of justice. Under that circumstance, 
her claim would be time-barred and she would be afforded no relief whatsoever. 
An "enhanced risk" of future harm may be considered "speculative" in the 
absence of actual present harm or injury, but that does not render a claim for 
future damages arising out of such enhanced risk inactionable when there has 
been actual injury. Our Supreme Court has never declared that a person with a 
present harm may not also claim a future harm. 
In Utah, juries are instructed all the time that they may assess future 
damages. See, e.g.. MUJI Instruction 27.2. 27.3 and 27.5 4 
The chance of recurrence is a question of probability. A jury is provided 
statistical information from which it may make an informed decision. Jurors 
routinely are asked to decide whether an automobile collision victim's orthopedic 
injury will result in arthritis in the future. They frequently make decisions based 
4
 These instructions are attached as Exhibit "5." 
-13-
on competent medical testimony and generally accepted statistical probability. 
Though cancer is far more serious than arthritis, juries are competent to assess 
the probability of future harm in such cases just as they do in orthopedic injury 
cases. 
In short, the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Seale v. Gowans was 
misunderstood and misapplied by this Court in Medved and by the district court in 
this case. 
III. 
DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE WOULD HAVE BEEN 
FAIR IN THIS ACTION ONLY IF ACCOMPANIED BY AN 
EXPRESS JUDICIAL DECLARATION THAT THE SNOWS 
MAY REFILE THEIR ACTION AT ANY TIME, WHETHER OR 
NOT CANCER RECURS, WITHOUT BEING AT RISK FOR 
HAVING THEIR CLAIM DECLARED TIME-BARRED. 
A claim for actual, already sustained damages resulting from the 
negligence of another may not be rendered inactionable by its joinder with a claim 
for enhanced risk of sustaining future damages. Even //under Medved a claim 
for heightened risk of cancer recurrence were no longer ever actionable in Utah, 
a plaintiff still has a right to pursue a claim for present damages independent of 
the heightened risk of cancer recurrence. To hold otherwise would be contrary to 
-14-
our rules of pleadings. 
It is within the province of a plaintiff to declare what her claim is. Neither 
the district court nor this Court has the right to preclude Mrs. Snow from pursuing 
an action to recover damages for present and past injury merely because she 
also seeks damages for a heightened risk of future injury. 
In fl10 of the Medved decision, this Court declares: 
Seale preserves plaintiff's claim for actual damages 
until speculative damages become actual damages. 
(2004 WL 1065503 at p.4, fl10). Unless this assertion is given full, liberal 
interpretation, the rest of the Medved decision could work a terrible injustice. 
Assume, for example, this Court dismissed the pending court case without 
prejudice. Assume further that five years go by without a manifestation of any 
further cancer symptoms in Mrs. Snow. Assume that the Snows, believing the 
chances of further cancer troubles have diminished, decide then to proceed with 
their claim for the damages they have already sustained as a result of Dr. Irion's 
negligence. Will the new complaint they file at that time be actionable? Without 
this court expressly declaring now that the statute of limitations is indefinitely 
suspended, any dismissal without prejudice will be potentially illusory. A truly 
non prejudicial dismissal requires a concomitant express suspension of both the 
-15-
two year statute of limitations and the four year statute of repose5 pertaining to 
the Snows' claims6. 
IV. 
THE FAIREST COURSE WOULD BE TO REVERSE THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF DISMISSAL AND TO 
ALLOW THE SNOWS TO PURSUE THEIR CLAIM AT A 
SPEED APPROPRIATE TO MRS. SNOW'S CONDITION. 
If this Court were to affirm dismissal of the Snows' complaint without 
prejudice and the Snows were to thereafter file a new action seeking all of their 
damages except those directly relating to the heightened risk of cancer 
recurrence, dismissal of the new action would likely be sought on the ground that 
the limitations period had run. As of now, over two years have elapsed since Mr. 
and Mrs. Snow discovered Dr. Irion's negligence and harm flowing from it. 
5
 UCA §78-14-4(1) 
6
 The Medved decision highlights but only partially addresses the 
troublesome problem facing claimants who have sustained both actual and 
"speculative" damages in a case involving risk of cancer recurrence. Medved 
seems to suggest a plaintiff having both actual and "speculative" damages may 
safely hold her claim for actual damages in abeyance without fear of the statute 
of limitations running against her until the feared cancer recurs. If the feared 
cancer does not recur, however, it is not clear whether her present claim for 
actual damages will be barred if she holds off filing it longer than two years. 
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Bringing a new action for past harm might well be viewed as violating the statute 
of limitations. 
I h 
circumstances would clearly be unfair. So too is it unfair to tell the Snows, in 
effect: "even though you have already sustained harm, you may not maintain a 
cl 
harm based on your fear of the cancer reappearing. Instead, you must wait until 
that fear is realized." It would be far fairer to reverse the district court's 
dismissal nt Mi ' >imw ', rl.iim , mil li i illnv the Snows 
action at a speed appropriate to Mrs. Snow's condition, even if that means the 
case moves slower than suggested by the Rule 26 guidelines. 
i may argue the pendency of an unresolved action againsl 
causes him harm. This may be true but such harm, if any, is small7 in 
comparison harm and prejudice the Snows will experience if they are not 
7
 Until this case is resolved, no money judgment will be entered against Dr. 
Irion. Dr. Irion will not sustain any greater "injury" than what he has already 
sustained by having been named as a defendant in a medical malpractice action. 
The costs and fees he may incur will increase only if and when the Snows move 
forward with their claim. Whatever delay occurs may actually benefit rather than 
harm Dr. Irion. As long as nothing happens in the case, Dr. Irion is free from a 
"bad" result. 
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allowed to pursue any claim. Neither the judicial system nor the district court's 
individual docket will be appreciably harmed by allowing the Snows to move their 
claim forward against Dr. Irion at a speed appropriate to her condition. The 
circumstances of this case justify an exception to the normal scheduling routine 
contemplated by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUEST 
Mrs. Snow's complaint amply alleges present, legally cognizable injuries 
and harm separate from and in addition to her claim for future harm based upon 
her heightened risk for cancer recurrence. The allegations of her complaint 
render inappropriate as a matter of law the district court's dismissal of her entire 
suit. 
This Court's Medved decision, as applied by the district court, misconstrues 
and is at variance with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Seale v. Gowans. 
Applying the alleged Medved holding to this case would work an unconscionable, 
unsupportable injustice. 
Dismissal without prejudice could be fair in this action only if accompanied 
by an express judicial declaration that the Snows may refile their action at any 
-18-
time, regardless of whether cancer recurs, without being at risk for having their 
claim declared time-barred. 
This (,,(iuiI',IiiniliI reverse IIii1 ill I IH I IM I I I I , deusion ii ' i irl.iti tin 'iiinvr. 
complaint and allow them to pursue their claim for both present harms and future 
harms. The Snows should be allowed the opportunity to prove in this present 
action that they will I > 
recur in Mrs. Snow as a result of Dr. Irion's negligence. 
Respectfully submitted this g* I day of March, 2005. 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the *%l day of March, 2005,1 delivered via the 
method indicated two (2) copies of the foregoing to the following: 
Elliott J. Williams 
Carol Stevens Jensen 
Williams & Hunt 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
• 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Hand-Delivered 
Federal Express 
f) 
Pldg Appeals Brief.0317 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBITS 
1. District Court's September i /, 2004 Memorandum Decision. 
2. District Court's September 27, 2004 formal Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice. 
3. Utah Supreme 1 
(Utah 1996). 
4. Court of Appeals Decision in Medved v. Glenn, 2004 WL 1065503. 
5. MUJI 27.2, 27.3 and 27.5. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARION SNOW a n d ROGER SNOW, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v s . 
RICHARD A IRION, M.D., 
D e f e n d a n t 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
C a s e No. 0 4 0 9 0 8 6 0 1 
H o n o r a b l e GLENN K. IWASAKI 
C o u r t C l e r k : J j ^ g g gRffflCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
, , — S E P 17 2004 
— ^ P ^ W T L A K E CQUN/Y 
Deputy Clerk 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court heard oral argument 
with respect to the motion on September 13, 2004. Following the 
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement. The Court having 
considered the motion and memoranda and for the good cause shown, 
hereby enters the following ruling. 
On June 18, 2002, defendant Richard A. Irion, M.D., 
performed a vaginal hysterectomy on Mrs. Snow, for post-
menopausal bleeding. During the surgery, Dr. Irion observed and 
removed a mass on Mrs. Snow's ovary. With this Complaint, 
plaintiffs allege that in attempting to remove the mass, Dr. 
Irion ruptured the tumor, spilling its contents into Mrs. Snow's 
body. It is plaintiffs' position the presence of the tumor 
should have been discovered in advance, which would have 
SNOW v. IRION Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
permitted excision of the tumor abdominally and avoided the 
injury which occurred in this case. Plaintiffs are alleging 
present damages as well as damages based upon Mrs. Snow's 
heightened risk of cancer recurrence. 
With this motion, defendant asserts that because Mrs. Snow 
has not suffered a recurrence of the cancer, plaintiffs are 
unable, as a matter of law, to establish a legally cognizable 
injury to satisfy their prima facie claims of medical negligence 
against Dr. Irion. See Medved v. Glenn et al., 2004 WL 1065503 
(Utah Ct. App. 2004; see also Seale v. Gowans, 823 P.2d 1361 
(Utah 1996). 
Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing they have amply alleged 
legally cognizable injuries separate and apart from, and in 
addition to, Mrs. Snow's heightened risk for cancer, and even if 
under Medved the claim for heightened risk for cancer is nor 
actionable, plaintiffs still have a right ro pursue a claim for 
present damages, independently. Moreover, it is plaintiffs' 
position dismissal without prejudice could be fair only if 
accompanied by an express judicial declaration that plaintiffs 
may re-file their action at any time, whether or not the cancer 
recurs, without being at risk for having their claim declared 
time-barred. Finally, it is plaintiffs' position the most 
reasonable course would be to deny the motion to dismiss and 
SNOW v. IRION Page 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
allow them to pursue their claim at a speed appropriate to Mrs. 
Snow's condition. 
Referring to Sealef the Medved court stated the following: 
The supreme court held that the statute of 
limitation did not begin to run on the 
plaintiff's claim until she discovered the 
recurrence of cancer because, under Utah law, 
claims cannot be split by plaintiffs. See 
[Seale 923 P.2d at 1364] (noting 
parenthetically that "[o]nce injury results, 
there is but a single tort and not a series 
of separate torts. . .. [A] plaintiff may not 
split a cause of action by seeking damages 
for some of his injuries in one suit and for 
later-developing injuries in another (first 
and third alterations in original)(citation 
omitted). Accordingly, the statute of 
limitations begins to run on all present and 
future claims once harm is discovered. See 
id. In Seale, the claimed harm was the 
recurrence of the cancer, and since i"c did 
not manifest itself until three years after 
the plaintiff's radical mastectomy, the 
statute of limitation began running when the 
plaintiff discovered the recurrence. See id. 
at 1365-66. To hold otherwise would allow 
statutes of limitation to run on negligence 
claims that had yet to occur. See id. at 
1364. 
Based upon the forgoing, it is clear that under the current 
sate of the law, the Snows cannot pursue their possible later-
developing damages, nor may they split their claims as they are 
seeking to do. Accordingly, dismissal, without prejudice is 
appropriate. Consequently, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is 
granted. 
SNOW v. IRION Page 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
DATED this /? day of September, 2004 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 040908601 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail CAROLYN STEVENS JENSEN 
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SUITE 500, PO BOX 45678 
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84145-5678 
Mail DOUGLAS G MORTENSEN 
ATTORNEY PLA 
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ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483) 
CAROLYN STEVENS JENSEN (6338) 
WILLIAMS & H U N T 
Attorneys for Defendant, Richard A. Irion, M.D. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Phone (801) 521-5678 
Facsimile (801) 364.4500 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
2 7 2004 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARION SNOW and ROGER SNOW 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
RICHARD A. IRION, M.D. 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS 
MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE 
Civil No: 040908601 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Glenn K. 
Iwasaki on September 13, 2004 at the hour of ) a.m. on Dr. Irion's Motion to 
Dismiss without Prejudice. Douglas G. Mortensen, of Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & 
Jeppson, appeared on behalf of plaintiffs Marion and Roger Snow, and Carolyn Stevens 
Jensen, of Williams & Hunt, appeared on behalf of defendant Dr. Richard A. Irion. 
The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel and having considered the 
pleadings, memoranda, affidavits and exhibits that have been filed by the parties, and being 
fully advised, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that defendant's Motion to Dismiss is 
Granted, and the above-captioned action and the plaintiffs Complaint, be and the same are 
hereby dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Bichard A. Irion, M.D., the parties to 
bear their own respective costs and attorney fees. 
DATED this Day of. ., 2004. 
BY THE COURT 
Glenn K. Iwasaki 
District Court Judge 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
DOUGLAS G. MQRTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2 
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COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
NIKKI BOWEN, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in the law offices of 
Williams & Hunt, attorneys for Defendant, Richard A. Irion, M.D., herein; that she 
served the attached Order Granting Defendant's Motioi 1 to Dismiss witl lout Prejud ice in 
Case No. 040908601 before the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an 
envelope addressed to: 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
Douglas G. Mortensen 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, PC. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the day of 
September, 2004. 
Nikki Bowen 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this £p"l\Vday of September, 2004. 
NOTARY PUBLIC I 
DANETTEA. LYON | 
257 East 200 South Ste 500 
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_ STATE OF1ITAH J 
SEALE v, 
Cite ss 923 P^d 
John SEALE, personal representative 
of the Estate of Beverley Seale, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Donald F. GOWANS, M.D., and Holy Cross 
Hospital, dba Holy Cross Breast Center, 
and Holy Cross Breast Care Services, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 940599. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 2, 1996. 
Rehearing Denied Oct. 2, 1996. 
Patient brought medical malpractice ac-
tion against physicians for alleged negligent 
failure to diagnose her breast cancer. The 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Richard ^J. 
Moffat, J., denied patient's motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding verdict, and entered 
judgment for physicians on basis that action 
was time barred. Patient appealed. T^e 
Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that physi-
cians failed to establish that patient suffered 
legal harm, as would begin running of tw0-
year medical malpractice limitations period, 
on date that cancer spread from her breast 
to her lymph nodes. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Stewart, Associate C.J., concurred in re-
sult 
1. Appeal and Error <S=>934(1), 1024.4 
When party challenges trial court's deni-
al of judgment notwithstanding verdict 
(JNOV) on ground that evidence presented }s 
insufficient to support jury verdict, state Su-
preme Court reverses only if, viewing evi-
dence in light most favorable to prevailing 
party, Court concludes that evidence is insuf-
ficient to support verdict. Rules CivJProc., 
Rule 59. 
GOWANS Utah 1361 
1361 (Utah 1996) 
2. Limitation of Actions <3>95(12) 
Two-year limitations period for bringing 
medical malpractice action does not begin to 
run until injured person knew or should have 
known that he or she had sustained "injury 
and that injury was caused by negligent ac-
tion. U.CA1953, 78-144. 
3. Limitation of Actions <2^55(3) 
Physicians failed to establish that pa-
tient suffered legal harm, as would begin 
running of two-year medical malpractice limi-
tations period, on date that cancer spread 
from her breast to her lymph nodes; only 
evidence produced by physicians was ~ that 
cancer's ^spread to lymph nodes increased 
risk that cancer would recur. U.C.A.1953, 
78-14-4. 
4. Limitation of Actions <£=>55(1) 
Once some harm is manifest, the limita-
tions period begins to run on all tort claims, 
present and future. 
5. Negligence <3=*1 
Until there is actual loss or damage 
resulting to interests of another, claim for 
negligence is not actionable. 
6. Negligence c=>103 
Without proof of actual damages, alleged 
claim for enhanced risk is not adequate to 
sustain cause of action for negligence. 
Fred R. Silvester, Clark A. McClellan, Salt 
Lake City, for the Seaies. 
J. Anthony Eyre, Kirk Gibbs, Salt Lake 
City, for Dr. Gowans. 
David W. Slagle, Terence L. Rooney, Brian 
P. Miller, Salt Lake City, for Holy Cross. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Plaintiff Beverley Seale appeals the trial 
court's denial of her motion for a judgment 
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notwithstanding the verdict.1 The trial 
court, upon findings made by a jury, held 
that the statute of limitations barred Ms. 
Seale from bringing a medical malpractice 
claim against defendants Donald F. Gowans, 
M.D., and Holy Cross Hospital, dba Holy 
Cross Breast Center and Holy Cross Breast 
Care Services, for Dr. Gowans* allegedly neg-
ligent failure to diagnose her breast cancer. 
Ms. Seale now contends that there was insuf-
ficient evidence to uphold the verdict. We 
agree. 
This case arose from Dr. Gowans* alleged 
failure to detect a mass in Ms. Sealed mam-
mogram taken in August 1987 at Holy Cross 
Hospital. This mass was not discovered until 
May 1988, when Ms. Seale had another mam-
mogram taken at the same hospital. Ms. 
Seale was then referred to Dr. Hugh Hogle, 
who performed a needle biopsy. The biopsy 
revealed that the mass was cancerous. 
When Dr. Hogle disclosed the results of the 
biopsy to Ms. Seale, he also showed her the 
mammogram taken in 1987 and pointed out 
to her that it contained the same, although 
smaller, mass found in the 1988 mammo-
gram. 
Within a few days, Ms. Seale underwent a 
radical mastectomy. Pathological studies of 
the removed area revealed that a second 
malignant tumor had formed and that the 
cancer had spread to eight of her twenty 
lymph nodes. Although all known cancerous 
areas had been removed, Dr. Hogle told Ms. 
Seale that the finding of cancer in her lymph 
nodes signified a statistically increased prob-
ability that cancer would recur in other parts 
of her body. Ms. Seale subsequently under-
1. Ms. Seale, who originally appealed, is now 
deceased. John Seale, her personal representa-
tive, has been substituted as plaintiff. 
I. Ms. Seale actually commenced this action a 
few days before doctors informed her that the 
cancer had spread to her hip. Defendants tfms 
argue that Ms. Seale knew of her injury before 
the recurrence of the cancer in 1991. We find 
no merit to this contention. As discussed hereaf-
ter, if Ms. Seale's cancer had not recurred, she 
could not have recovered for an enhanced risk of 
the cancer's recurrence. 
went radiation treatment and hormone thera-
py to enhance the likelihood of complete re-
covery. She continued to receive treatment 
and to have periodic monitoring for recur-
rence of the cancer. Up until August 1991, 
all subsequent tests remained negative. 
In the summer of 1991, Ms. Seale began 
experiencing discomfort in her left hip. Af-
ter receiving unsuccessful treatment for the 
pain, Ms. Seale had a bone scan in August 
1991 which revealed cancer in her left hip. 
That same month, Ms. Seale commenced this 
action2 against Dr. Gowans and Holy Cross 
Hospital for their allegedly negligent delay in 
diagnosing her cancer, which allowed the 
cancer to spread to her hip.3 
Defendants affirmatively pleaded that the 
two-year limitations period in section 78-14-4 
of the Utah Code barred Ms. Seale's action. 
They argued that the limitations period be-
gan to run in 1988 when Ms. Seale learned of 
her breast cancer and was shown her 1987 
mammogram, which contained the suspicious 
mass Dr. Gowans failed to detect. 
The trial court initially denied defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, holding that 
a factual issue existed as to whether Ms. 
Seale knew or had reason to know of her 
legal injury in 1988. Upon motion to bifur-
cate the trial, the statute of limitations issue 
was tried separately before a jury, which 
returned a special verdict in favor of defen-
dants finding that Ms. Seale "discovered, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered," her injury in June 
1988, when she was correctly diagnosed. 
Ms. Seale subsequently filed a motion for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
3. Both parties use the terms "metastasis" and 
"metastasized" to denote the spread of die can-
cer. Defendants construe diese terms to mean 
any spread of the cancer, including die spread to 
the adjacent lymph nodes. Plaintiff argues that 
metastasis is the spread to another part of the 
body. We find diis definitional debate inconse-
quential. The true issue is whether the spread to 
Ms. Seale's lymph nodes constitutes a legally 
cognizable injury. Thus, to avoid confusion, we 
refer to the spread of Ms. Seale's cancer from 
her breast to her hip as a "recurrence" of the 
cancer. 
SEALE v. 
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(j.n.o.v.), which the trial court denied. Ms. 
Seale now appeals that denial, contending 
that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the verdict. She argues that the evidence 
does not show that she could have discovered 
any injury from which she sustained dam-
ages until the cancer recurred in her hip. 
Thus, she posits, the trial court erred in 
refusing to grant her motion for a j.n.o.v.4 
[1] Before reaching the merits, we set 
forth the standard of review. A trial court 
must enter a j.n.o.v. in circumstances where 
"the facts or the law do not support the 
verdict. Utah R.Civ.P. 59; see also Crook-
ston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 
(Utah 1991) ("In passing on a motion for a 
j.n.o.v., . . a trial court has no latitude and 
must be correct.")- When a party challenges 
a trial court's denial of a j.n.o.v. on the 
ground that the evidence presented is insuffi-
cient to support a jury verdict, we "reverse 
only if, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party, we con-
clude that the evidence is insufficient to sup-
port the verdict." Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 
839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992); see also 
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 799; Hansen v Stew-
art, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). Thus Ms. 
Seale " 'must marshal all the evidence sup-
porting the verdict' and then show that the 
evidence cannot support the verdict." Han-
sen, 761 P.2d at 17-18 (quoting Pnce-Orem 
Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 
713 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1986)). 
[2] The statute of limitations applicable 
to malpractice actions against health care 
providers, commonly referred to as the "dis-
covery rule," is set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
$ 78-14-4, which provides in part: 
No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is com-
menced within two years after the plaintiff 
or patient discovers, or through the use of 
4- ~Ms Seale also argues that the trial court erred 
111
 refusing to present her proposed instruction to 
the jury However, because we find that the trial 
judge erred in finding that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict, we do not 
reach this argument 
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reasonable diligence should have discover-
ed the injury 
In Foil v. Bollinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 
(Utah 1979), this court construed the term 
''injury" in section 78-14-4 to mean "legal 
injury." In other words, the two-year limita-
tions period "does not commence to run until 
the injured person knew or should have 
known that he had sustained an injury and 
that the injury was caused by negligent ac-
tion." Id,; see also Chapman v. Primary 
Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 
1989) ("Discovery of legal injury . . . encom-
passes both awareness of physical injury and 
knowledge that the injury is or may be at-
tributable to negligence.").5 In Foil, we 
adopted the following reasoning from the 
Oregon Supreme Court: 
To say that a cause of action accrues to a 
person when she may maintain an action 
thereon and, at the same time, that it 
accrues before she had or can reasonably 
be expected to have knowledge of any 
wrong inflicted upon her is patently incon-
sistent and unrealistic. She cannot main-
tain an action before she knows she has 
one. To say to one who has been wronged, 
"You had a remedy, but before the wrong 
was ascertainable to you, the law stripped 
you of your remedy," makes a mockery of 
the law. 
601 P.2d at 148-^9 (quoting Berry v. Bran-
ner, 245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (1966)). 
[3] As with any affirmative defense, de-
fendants have the burden of proving every 
element necessary to establish that the stat-
ute of limitations bars Ms. Seale's claim. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 9(h) ("[T]he party pleading the 
statute must establish, on the trial, the facts 
showing that the cause of action is so 
barred."); see also Stewart v. K& S Co., 591 
P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1979); Slayden v. Sixta, 
250 Kan. 23, 825 P.2d 119, 122 (1992). De-
5. The court correctly instructed the jury that 
"[k]nowledge of a 'Legal Injury' is defined as the 
date upon which the injured person knows or 
should know that she has sustained an injury and 
that the injury was caused by negligence " 
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fendants contend that the evidence produced 
at trial shows that in May 1988, Ms. Seale 
had discovered or should have discovered 
both Dr. Gowans' negligence in failing to 
detect her cancer and the injury that result-
ed from that negligence. They assert that 
the injury triggering the running of the stat-
ute was the cancer's spread to Ms. Seale's 
lymph nodes, which statistically increased 
the chance that the cancer would recur and 
thus decreased her chance of long-term sur-
vival.6 
We agree that the evidence was sufficient 
to show that in 1988, she knew or should 
have known that Dr. Gowans had negligently 
failed to diagnose her cancer. We also agree 
that the evidence was sufficient to show that 
in 1988, Ms. Seale knew of the cancer's 
spread to her lymph nodes. However, defen-
dants have failed to show that the cancer's 
spread to her lymph nodes was a sufficient 
legal injury to start the running of the limita-
tions period. 
[4,5] General tort law recognizes that 
when a person has suffered physical harm 
caused by the negligence of another, "he is 
entitled to recover damages not only for 
harm already suffered, but also for that 
which will probably result m the future." 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 912 cmt. e 
(1979); Jackson v Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp, 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th Cir.1986). In-
deed, most courts follow the general rule that 
once some injury becomes actionable, a plain-
tiff must plead all damages, both present and 
future, and cannot thereafter bring another 
action once future harm occurs. Gideon v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp, 761 F.2d 1129, 
1136-37 (5th Cir.1985) ("[0]nce injury results 
6. Dr Hogle testified 
[W]omen who have small tumors with no posi-
tive nodes have long-term survival in excess of 
85 percent, 90 percent When the lymph 
nodes are involved, it drops significantly, to 
slightiy under 50 percent, and the more lymph 
nodes that are involved the higher the proba-
bilities are that we're dealing with systemic 
disease 
In the arena of asbestos exposure, a few courts 
have construed the "single cause of action" rule 
so as not to preclude a later suit for latent 
there is but a single tort and not a series of 
separate torts, one for each resultant 
harm . . . [A] plaintiff may not split this" 
cause of action by seeking damages for some 
of his injuries in one suit and for later-
developing injuries in another.");7 see also~~ 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 24-
26 (1982). Accordingly, once some harm is 
manifest, the limitations period begins to run 
on all claims, present and future. See Sevy 
v. Security Title Co, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 
1995) ("The general rule regarding statutes 
of limitations is that the limitation period 
begins to run- when the last event necessary 
to complete the cause of action occurs."). 
However, the law does not recognize an in-
choate wrong, and therefore, until there is 
" 'actual loss or damage resulting to the in-
terests of another/ " a claim for negligence is 
not actionable. Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1136 
(quoting Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 30, 
at 165 (5th ed. 1984)); see also Hunsaker v 
State, 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993) (actual 
damages along with breach of duty must be 
pleaded to sustain cause of action for negli-
gence). As a result, even though there exists 
a possibility, even a probability, of future 
harm, it is not enough to sustain a claim, and 
a plaintiff must wait until some harm mani-
fests itself. Keeton, supra, at 165. Until a 
plaintiff suffers actual harm or damages, the 
limitations period will not accrue. 
[6] Applying these principles to the in-
stant case, we find that defendants failed to 
prove that Ms. Seale suffered a legally cogni-
zable injury when she discovered that the 
cancer had spread to her lymph nodes. The 
only evidence that defendants produced re-
garding the harmful consequence of the can-
disease even though earlier injuries were in-
curred Eg, Wilson v Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp, 684 F 2 d 111, 112 (D C Cir 1982) (allow-
ing suit for mesothelioma even though deceased 
had earlier discovered he had asbestosis without 
bringing suit for that disease) Because defen-
dants have failed to show mat Ms Seale discov-
ered any damages resulting from the spread to 
her lymph nodes m 1988, we need not address 
whether we would similarly construe the single 
cause of action rule for failure to diagnose cases 
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cer's spread was that it increased the r&k 
that the cancer would recur. They failed £° 
argue or produce evidence that in 1988, M2-
Seale could complain of any actual preset 
damages. Although we agree that the carr-
eer's spread resulted in a dramatic decrea£e 
in Ms. Seale's chance of survival, we concluo*e 
that without proof of actual damages, an 
alleged claim for enhanced risk is not ad£~ 
quate to sustain a cause of action for negli" 
gence. See Steingart v. Oliver, 198 Cal* 
App.3d 406, 243 CaLRptr. 678, 681 (198$ 
(holding that breach of professional duty 
causing only nominal damages, speculative 
harm, or threat of future harm does ntft 
suffice to create cause of action for negll"* 
gence).8 As a result, defendants have faile^ 
to meet their burden of showing that M£-
Seale discovered any legally cognizable inji>~ 
statutory time period when she brought he? 
action in 1991 when the cancer appeared i*1 
her hip. 
Defendants' reliance on cases from other 
jurisdictions is misplaced. See Colbert *0-
Georgetown Univ, 641 A2d 469, 47^ 
(D.C.Cir.1994) (en banc) (negligent perfor* 
mance of lumpectomy instead of radical maS~ 
tectomy); Swain v. Curry, 595 So.2d 168,171 
(Dist.Ct.App.1992), review denied, 601 So.2^ 
551 (Fla.1992) (failure to detect breast can-
cer). In these cases, the evidence showed 
that the plaintiffs had suffered actual dam' 
ages in conjunction with the increased risk of 
the cancer's recurrence. Ms. Seale's case is 
more similar to the circumstance addressed 
by the Florida Court of Appeals in Johnsoft 
y. Mullee, 385 So.2d 1038 (Dist.CtApp.1980)> 
review denied, 392 So.2d 1377 (Fla.1981). I£ 
that case, a doctor's misdiagnosis caused & 
patient's cancer to go undetected for si* 
months. Similar to Ms. Seale's circum-
stance, pathological studies of the area re-
moved from the patient also revealed that 
°. This case is unlike the situation we addressed 
in Hansen v Mountain Fuel Supply Co , 858 P 2& 
970, 979-81 (Utah 1993) In that case, we ruled 
°n the narrow issue of whether an individual 
could recover for medical monitoring costs nc 
cessitated by an increased risk of contracting 
cancer due to an exposure to asbestos We did 
GOWANS Utah 1365 
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the cancer had spread to the patient's lymph 
nodes. Id. at 1039. However, the patient 
did not file suit for the negligent misdiagno-
sis until the cancer had recurred in another 
part of her body two years later. The court 
held that under those circumstances, the 
trigger date for the purposes of the statute 
of limitations was when she "first learned 
that the cancer had metastasized beyond the 
surgically removed portions" to another part 
of her body, not when the patient was cor-
rectly diagnosed. Id at 1040-41. The court 
reasoned that when the patient first learned 
of the misdiagnosis, there was no evidence 
that the alleged negligence "had resulted in 
any harm to her." Id. at 1040. The court 
then noted that under the discovery rule, "it 
is the knowledge of injury " which triggers 
the statute, "not notice of probable or possi-
Our holding that damages in the form of 
an enhanced risk only are not sufficient to 
start the running of the statute of limitations 
not only comports with generally accepted 
principles of tort law, but also mmimizes the 
filing of speculative suits, thus saving judicial 
time and resources. More importantly, any 
alternative ruling might effectively preclude 
a patient from any recovery, even when a 
significant harmful effect, such as the recur-
rence of cancer, later occurs. As previously 
noted, current recovery for future harm is 
"based upon the probability that harm of one 
sort or another will ensue and upon its prob-
able seriousness if it should ensue." Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 912 cmt. e 
(1979). Many courts, following the Restate-
ment approach, have adopted a "reasonably 
certain" standard, requiring that the plain-
tiffs prove that it is more likely than not that 
the projected consequence will occur. See 
Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 
F.2d 111, 119 (D.C.Cir.1982). Following this 
approach, if we were to adopt defendants' 
not reach the issue of whether the enhanced risk 
alone was a sufficient injury to support a cause 
of action Id at 973 n 2 In fact, we noted that 
the plaintiffs could bring another action "if and 
when they do develop a serious disease as a 
result of their exposure." Id at 973. 
Ut Rep 2d (922 928)—7 
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position, plaintiffs who are not exhibiting any-
actual physical harm but are facing the run-
ning of the limitations period would be forced 
to bring an action for injuries that may or 
may not occur in the future. However, many 
of these plaintiffs will be unable to produce 
the necessary evidence to show that the fu-
ture harm is more likely to occur than not. 
Yet if the harm, such as the recurrence of 
cancer, actually later occurs, the plaintiff 
would be precluded from any recovery for 
devastating injuries by reason of having ac-
quired an earlier claim for purely speculative 
ones. We believe that the better approach is 
to wait until the potential harm manifests 
itself, allowing for more certain proof and 
fewer speculative lawsuits. 
Because the only evidence defendants pre-
sented at trial, and the only evidence Ms. 
Seale could marshal, showed that Ms. Seale 
could not have discovered any legally cogni-
zable injury until 1991, we find that the 
evidence was insufficient for a jury to find 
that Ms. Seale discovered her injury in 1988. 
As a result, the trial court erred in denying 
Ms. Seale's motion for a j.n.o.v. We reverse 
and remand the case to allow John Seale, as 
Ms. Seale's personal representative, to argue 
her case on its merits. 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., HOWE, J., and GUY 
R. BURNINGHAM, District Judge, concur 
in Justice DURHAM'S opmion. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & Mc 
DONOUGH, a Utah professional eorpo 
ration, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross 
Appellant, 
v. 
Jerilyn Shelton DAWSON, Defendant, 
Appellant, and Cross-Appellee. 
No. 940595. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 6, 1996. 
Law firm brought action against former 
client to collect attorney fees incurred repre-
senting client in divorce action. The District 
Court, Washington County, J. Philip Eves, 
J., awarded firm attorney fees incurred in 
divorce but denied request for attorney fees 
incurred in collection action. Client appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that: 
(1) collateral estoppel did not bar chent from 
rehtigating reasonableness of attorney fees; 
(2) attorney's oral statements capped fees to 
which firm was entitled; and (3) firm was not 
entitled to collect fee for pro se representa-
tion in collection action. 
Affirmed as amended. 
STEWART, Associate C J., concurs in the 
result. 
Having disqualified himself, RUSSON, J., 
does not participate herein; District Judge 
GUY R BURNINGHAM sat. 
1. Appeal and Error <S=>1008.1(5) 
Trial court's finding is clearly erroneous 
if it is against clear weight of evidence or if 
appellate court otherwise reaches definite 
and firm conviction that mistake has been 
made. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a). 
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2. Appeal and Error <s=>842(2) 
Supreme Court reviews trial court's le-
gal deteiroinations for correctness, granting 
them no deference. 
3. Judgment e=>634 
For collateral estoppel to bar relitigation 
of issue, issue challenged must be identical m 
previous action and in case at hand, issue 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jamie MEDVED, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
C. Joseph GLENN, M.D.; and Estate of Blayne L. 
Hirsche, M.D., Defendants and 
Appellees. 
No. 20030338-CA. 
May 13, 2004. 
Background: Patient brought medical malpractice 
action against gynecologist and surgeon, alleging 
that defendants failed to timely diagnose breast 
cancer. Defendants filed motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. The Fourth District, Provo Department, 
Lynn W Davis, J., granted motion and dismissed 
action without prejudice. Patient appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held 
that: 
(1) claim for damages concerning increased risk of 
recurrence of cancer was not actionable, and thus 
prohibition on splitting actual and speculative 
claims arising from a single tort warranted dismissal 
without prejudice, and 
(2) claim for actual damages would be preserved, 
for limitations purposes, until speculative damages 
became actual damages. 
Affirmed. 
[1] Appeal and Error €^=>863 
30k863 Most Cited Cases 
Because a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted is a conclusion of law, 
Court of Appeals reviews such dismissal for 
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's 
decision. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 12(b)(6). 
[2] Pretrial Procedure €=^622 
307Ak622 Most Cited Cases 
[2] Pretrial Procedure €^>680 
307Ak680 Most Cited Cases 
Purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted is to 
challenge the formal sufficiency of the claim for 
relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the merits 
of a case. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 12(b)(6). 
[3] Action €=>53(2) 
13k53(2) Most Cited Cases 
Patient's claim for damages concerning increased 
nsk of recurrence of cancer was not actionable m 
medical malpractice action alleging that 
gynecologist and surgeon failed to earlier diagnose 
patient's breast cancer, and thus prohibition on 
splitting actual and speculative claims arising from 
a single tort warranted dismissal of action without 
prejudice; claim was speculative in that patient had 
not suffered recurrence of cancer and recurrence 
was not a foregone conclusion. 
[3] Health €=>673 
198Hk673 Most Cited Cases 
[3] Health € ^ 6 8 4 
198Hk684 Most Cited Cases 
Patient's claim for damages concerning increased 
risk of recurrence of cancer was not actionable in 
medical malpractice action alleging that 
gynecologist and surgeon failed to earlier diagnose 
patient's breast cancer, and thus prohibition on 
splitting actual and speculative claims arising from 
a single tort warranted dismissal of action without 
prejudice; claim was speculative m that patient had 
not suffered recurrence of cancer and recurrence 
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was not a foregone conclusion 
[4] Damages €=>J41 
115kl41 Most Cited Cases 
Once some injury becomes actionable, a plaintiff 
generally must plead all damages, both present and 
future, and cannot thereafter bring another action 
once future harm occurs 
[4] Judgment €^600.1 
228k600 1 Most Cited Cases 
Once some injury becomes actionable, a plaintiff 
generally must plead all damages, both present and 
future, and cannot thereafter bring another action 
once future harm occurs 
[5] Negligence € ^ 4 6 0 
272k460 Most Cited Cases 
The law does not recognize an inchoate wrong, and 
therefore, until there is actual loss or damage 
resulting to the interests of another, a claim for 
negligence is not actionable 
[6] Limitation of Actions €^55(3) 
241k55(3) Most Cited Cases 
Patient's claim m medical malpractice action for 
actual damages resulting from doctors' alleged 
failure to timely diagnose breast cancer would be 
preserved, for limitations purposes, until speculative 
damages concerning increased risk of recurrence of 
cancer became actual damages, actual and 
speculative damages arising from a single tort could 
not be split 
Fourth District, Provo Department, The Honorable 
Lynn W Davis 
James W Gilson and Michael F Richman, Murray, 
for Appellant 
Curtis J Drake, Anne D Armstrong, and Dennis C 
Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
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DAVIS, Judge 
*1 |^ 1 Plaintiff appeals the trial court's dismissal 
of her complaint, pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
H 2 From 1991 through early 1998, Dr. Glenn 
served as Plaintiffs obstetrician/gynecologist. In 
late 1997, Dr Glenn diagnosed a lump on Plaintiffs 
breast as fibrocystic breast disease. On July 13, 
1998, Plaintiff saw Dr Hirsche [FN1] about a 
breast augmentation One week later, Dr. Hirsche 
ordered and performed a mammogram, which 
revealed dense fibroglandular tissue bilaterally, no 
significant abnormality, and no evidence of 
malignancy The report from the mammogram 
indicated that the breast was heterogeneously dense 
and that this may lower the sensitivity of 
mammography On August 12, 1998, Dr. Hirsche 
performed a bilateral breast augmentation and a 
needle aspiration of three suspected cysts on 
Plaintiffs right breast After monitoring Plaintiffs 
progress and the suspected cysts on her right breast, 
Dr Hirsche performed an excisional biopsy of three 
nght breast nodules on December 16, 1998. A 
pathological examination of the excisional biopsy 
revealed the presence of differentiated infiltrating 
ductal carcmoma To treat this particularly 
malevolent form of breast cancer, Plaintiff 
underwent a radical mastectomy of her right breast 
on December 28, 1998, and followed that procedure 
with chemotherapy, radiation therapy, and surgical 
reconstruction of her breast To this date, Plaintiff 
has not suffered a recurrence of cancer 
TI 3 Plaintiff filed her complamt against Dr Glenn 
and Dr Hirsche (collectively, Defendants) on 
March 5, 2001, alleging that they acted negligently 
and delayed the breast cancer diagnosis Plaintiff 
further alleged that this delay caused her to undergo 
more extensive treatment than necessary, and left 
her with an increased risk of cancer recurrence 
Defendants, relying upon rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, filed a joint motion for 
dismissal without prejudice on August 2, 2002. The 
trial court, stating that "Utah law has not recognized 
claims of increased risk in the absence of a related 
injury [and that] Plaintiff has not claimed an 
injury clearly related to nsk[ of cancer 
recurrence,]" granted Defendant's joint motion and 
to Ong U S Govt Works 
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dismissed Plaintiffs complaint without prejudice on 
March 19, 2003 Plaintiff now appeals 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
D][2] 11 4 Although Plaintiff purports to raise 
several issues on appeal, she essentially argues that 
the trial court erred by dismissing without prejudice 
her complaint for current, actual damages and 
speculative damages Specifically, Plaintiff argues 
that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Seale v 
Gowans, 923 P 2d 1361 (Utah 1996), allows 
individuals to bring claims for both actual damages 
that have accrued and prospective damages that 
may or may not occur "Because a rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal is a conclusion of law, we review for 
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's 
decision " Whipple v Ainencan Foik hligation Co , 
910 P2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996) "[T]he purpose 
of a rule 12(b)(6) motion is to challenge the formal 
sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to establish 
the facts or resolve the merits of a case 
[Dismissal is justified only when the allegations of 
the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff 
does not have a claim " Id "In determining whether 
a trial court properly dismissed an action under rule 
12(b)(6), we assume that the factual allegations in 
the complaint are true and we draw all reasonable 
inferences m the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff "Id at 1219 
ANALYSIS 
*2 [3][4][5] 1) 5 "[M]ost courts follow the general 
rule that once some injury becomes actionable, a 
plaintiff must plead all damages, both present and 
future, and cannot thereafter bring another action 
once future harm occurs " Seale v Gowans, 923 
P2d 1361, 1364 (Utah 1996) (alteration m 
original) "[T]he law does not recognize an inchoate 
wrong, and therefore, until there is ' "actual loss or 
damage resulting to the interests of another," ' a 
claim for negligence is not actionable " Id 
(citations omitted) "As a result, even though there 
exists a possibility, even a probability, of future 
harm, it is not enough to sustain a claim, and a 
plaintiff must wait until some harm manifests 
itself "Id 
U 6 In Seale the Utah Supreme Court decided 
whether the statute of limitation for malpractice 
actions against health care providers barred the 
plaintiffs claim for negligent failure to diagnose her 
Copr © West 2004 No Claim 
Page 3 
breast cancer See id at 1362-66 Plaintiff claimed 
that the defendants failed to detect a cancerous mass 
in her breast during an earlier mammogram. See id 
at 1362 A few months later, a second mammogram 
showed a larger mass that was confirmed to be 
cancerous See id The plaintiff underwent a radical 
mastectomy, and although all known cancerous 
areas were removed, her doctors found that the 
cancer had spread to eight of her lymph nodes See 
id This spread increased the likelihood of 
recurrence of cancer See id Little more than three 
years after her mastectomy, a bone scan revealed 
that the cancer had recurred in her left hip See id 
The statute of limitation issue was tried before a 
jury, and the jury returned a verdict finding that the 
plaintiff should have discovered her injury when she 
was originally diagnosed with cancer, and therefore, 
the statute of limitation had run on her claim See id 
On appeal from the trial court's denial of the 
plaintiffs motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court See id at 1363, 1366 
H 7 The supreme court held that the statute of 
limitation did not begin to run on the plaintiffs 
claim until she discovered the recurrence of cancer 
because, under Utah law, claims cannot be split by 
plaintiffs See id at 1364 (noting parenthetically 
that " '[o]nce injury results there is but a single tort 
and not a senes of separate torts [A] plaintiff may 
not split this cause of action by seeking damages for 
some of his injuries m one suit and for 
later-developing injuries m another' " (first and 
third alterations m original) (citation omitted)) 
Accordingly, the statute of limitation begins to run 
on all present and future claims once a harm is 
discovered See id In Seale, the claimed harm was 
the recurrence of the cancer, and since it did not 
manifest itself until three years after the plaintiffs 
radical mastectomy the statute of limitation began 
running when the plaintiff discovered the 
recurrence See id at 1365-66 To hold otherwise 
would allow statutes of limitation to run on 
negligence claims that had yet to occur See id at 
1364 ("[T]he law does not recognize an inchoate 
wrong, and therefore, until there is ' "actual loss or 
damage resulting to the interests of another," ' a 
claim for negligence is not actionable " (citations 
omitted)) 
*3 H 8 Plaintiff argues that Seale does not prevent 
her from bringing a negligence action against 
Orig U S Govt Works 
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Defendants for their failure to diagnose her breast 
cancer earlier, nor does it prevent her from 
recovering damages for her actual harm as well as 
future damages if cancer recurs. Plaintiff points to 
language from Seale for the proposition that she 
may maintain a claim for the risk of cancer 
recurrence if she also presently claims actual 
damages. See id. at 1365 ("[W]e conclude that 
without proof of actual damages, an alleged claim 
for enhanced risk is not adequate to sustain a cause 
of action for negligence."). 
H 9 Plaintiffs reliance upon Seale for her position 
is misplaced. Seale clearly stands for the 
proposition that speculative claims are not allowed 
under Utah law. See id. at 1366 ("We believe that 
the better approach is to wait until the potential 
harm manifests itself, allowing for more certain 
proof and fewer speculative lawsuits."). 
[6] U 10 Then, relying on our prohibition against 
claim splitting, Plaintiff asserts that she should be 
allowed to pursue her claim for speculative 
damages so long as she simultaneously pursues her 
claim for actual damages. Seale does not stand for 
this proposition. Rather, Seale preserves Plaintiffs 
claim for actual damages until speculative damages 
become actual damages. See id. While it may be 
true that Plaintiff has an increased risk of cancer, 
whether the cancer will recur is purely speculative. 
Since the radical mastectomy, chemotherapy, 
radiation therapy, and reconstruction, Plaintiff has 
not suffered a recurrence of cancer. While she is 
faced with a higher risk of breast cancer, this 
recurrence is not a foregone conclusion. As such, 
Plaintiffs claim for the increased risk of recurrence 
of cancer is "not actionable." [FN2] Id. at 1364. 
]^ 11 We therefore conclude that the trial court 
correctly dismissed Plaintiffs action without 
prejudice. We do not reach the issue of whether 
Plaintiff may amend her pleadings to pursue her 
claim for actual damages, perhaps waiving her 
claim to speculative damages to avoid the 
proscription of Seale. Nor do we address the 
consequences of such an action, including the 
application of the statute of limitation to her claim 
for actual damages, unconnected to a claim for 
speculative damages. 
CONCLUSION 
Page 4 
Tj 12 Under Utah law, an action for negligence 
cannot be pursued until a plaintiff suffers an injury. 
The risk of the recurrence of cancer does not 
constitute an injury. Because both actual and 
speculative claims arising from a single tort cannot 
be split, we conclude that the trial court correctly 
dismissed Plaintiffs action without prejudice. 
H 13 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, 
Associate Presiding Judge and NORMAN H. 
JACKSON, Judge. 
FN1. Dr. Hirsche was killed in an airplane 
accident in November 2002, and on 
December 10, 2002, the estate of Dr. 
Hirsche was substituted as a party 
defendant. 
FN2. Plaintiff also relies upon George v. 
LDS Hospital 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990). George is inapposite to this 
case because (1) it was a wrongful death 
case where actual damages had already 
been sustained, and (2) the focus of the 
decision was on causation, not speculative 
damages. See id. at 1118-22. 
2004 WL 1065503, 2004 WL 1065503 (Utah 
App.), 499 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 2004 UT App 161 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
DAMAGES 27.2 
MUJI 27.2 
PERSONAL INJURY - GENERAL DAMAGES 
In awarding such damages, you may consider any pain, 
discomfort, and suffering, both mental and physical, its probable 
duration and severity, and the extent to which the plaintiff has 
been prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as 
previously enjoyed. You may also consider whether any of the 
above will, with reasonable certainty, continue in the future. If so, 
you may award such damages as will fairly and justly compensate 
the plaintiff for them. 
No definite standard or method of calculation is prescribed by 
law to fix reasonable compensation for pain and suffering. Nor is 
the opinion of any witness required as to the amount of such 
reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the argument of counsel 
as to the amount of damages is not evidence of reasonable 
compensation. In making an award for pain and suffering, you shall 
exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the 
damages you fix shall be just and reasonable in light of the 
evidence. 
References: 
Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216 (Utah 1980) 
Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670 (1953) 
BAJI No. 14.13 (Supp. 1992). Reprinted with permission; copyright ® 
1986 West Publishing Company 
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27.3 MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL 
MUJI 27,3 
PERSONAL INJURY - SPECIAL DAMAGES 
EXPENSES INCURRED 
In awarding such damages, you may consider the reasonable 
value of medical [hospital and nursing] care, services and supplies 
reasonably required and actually given in the treatment of the 
plaintiff [and the reasonable value of similar items that more 
probably than not will be required and given in the future]. 
Comments 
It may be necessary to spell out the collateral source rule in certain cases 
If that is necessary, the following may be added "The fact, if it be a fact, 
that any of the foregoing expenses were paid by some source other than the 
plaintiff's own funds does not affect the plaintiff's right to recover for such 
expenses " 
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27.5 MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL 
MUJI 27,5 
PERSONAL INJURY - SPECIAL DAMAGES 
LOSS OF FUTURE EARNING CAPACITY 
If you find the plaintiff has suffered a loss of earning capacity, 
you should award the present cash value of earning capacity 
reasonably likely to be lost in the future as a result of the injury in 
question. 
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